Author Sajid Yousuf Shah

As the Pakistani invaders captured Mirpur, Muzzaffarabad, Uri and Baramulla with minimal resistance from J&K forces, the fall of Srinagar looked imminent.

The darkest day in the history of Jammu and Kashmir was the intervening night of October 21-22, 1947, when Operation Gulmarg was launched under the command of Major General Akbar Khan to seize the land. October 22 is observed as a black day in the history of Jammu and Kashmir.

WHAT HAPPENED ON OCTOBER 22, 1947 AND WHY WE SHOULDN’T FORGET IT

When India got Independence and was partitioned to create Pakistan in August 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh. On October 20-21, 1947, about 20,000 tribesmen took over the bridges spanning Neelum river on the Hazara road linking Muzaffarabad and Abbottabad (now, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) and occupied the first major town of Muzaffarabad by October 21, and then moved further towards Uri. The first India-Pakistan War had formally begun that day. Major General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army, who had organised the attacks, later elaborated his feat in the book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’, published in Karachi.

Besides General Akbar Khan, among other people who planned and executed Operation Gulmarg was Shaukat Hayat Khan, a close aide of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The state machinery chose October 22, 1947 as the date for the attack. Shaukat Khan in his book ‘The Nation That Lost its Soul’ accepted that he was appointed supervisor of the Kashmir operation.

The first target of the invaders was Muzaffarabad and Mirpur. The attack on Mirpur and Muzaffarabad was mounted on October 22, 1947. Those who could not recite “Kalima” were killed (on the basis of their religion), their belongings looted by the raiders. Minorities (Hindus and Sikhs) had two options—either die or escape to Jammu. The raiders successfully captured Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, which was considered one of the great victories of Pakistan.

Now, their plan was to capture Srinagar by taking the route to Baramulla district, which is close to Muzzaffarabad. The attack on Baramulla commenced on October 24. The Pakistan Army assisted 20,000 kabalis (Pakistani tribesmen) in civil clothes to capture Baramulla and Srinagar. The tribesmen destroyed everything that came in their way.

The invaders did not even spare St Joseph’s Hospital in Baramulla; they killed patients, medical staff and burnt down the hospital building. Nuns performing their duties at the hospital were raped and killed by the invaders, including Pakistani Army men in civil clothes. They didn’t even spare sick, wounded patients at the hospital. They picked up young women as sex slaves and killed children, old women and men of all ages. The attack was so lethal that only 3,000 citizens of Baramulla out of a total population of 14,000 were said to had survived—a sad fact that Major General Akbar Khan, the main perpetrator of the attack, mentions in his book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’.

As the invaders captured Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Uri and Baramulla with minimal resistance from the J&K forces, the fall of Srinagar looked imminent. On October 24, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for military assistance to stop the aggression. He was scared of losing Srinagar; his request was considered on October 25 in a meeting of India’s Defence Committee, headed by Mountbatten and included Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Baldev Singh, minister without portfolio Gopalaswami Ayyangar, and British commanders-in-chief of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

The committee concluded that “the most immediate necessity was to rush arms and ammunition already requested by the Kashmir government, which would enable the local populace in Srinagar to put up some defence against the raiders,” according to Lt General K.K. Nanda’s book ‘War with No Gains’.

However, according to Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta’s book ‘Jammu and Kashmir’, Mountbatten warned that “it would be dangerous to send in any troops unless Kashmir had first offered to accede,” arguing that it would result in an India-Pakistan war. He suggested the accession should be considered as provisional, and “when law and order had been re-established in Kashmir, a plebiscite should be held as regards Kashmir’s future”.

The Defence Committee sent V.P. Menon, secretary, Ministry of States, to Srinagar to “make an on-the-spot study” the same day. He returned to New Delhi the next day with his impressions, and suggested sending troops to Kashmir, pointing out the “supreme necessity to save Kashmir from raiders”.

In the meantime, the new prime minister of J&K, Mehr Chand Mahajan, warned: “We have decided by 25th evening to go to India if we get a plane or else to Pakistan to surrender.”

Menon was then flown to Jammu to advise the Maharaja about the government’s view, and that’s when the Maharaja finally signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, and Menon returned to Delhi with Mahajan. The Instrument of Accession was signed on matters of defence, communications and foreign affairs.

LION OF BARAMULLA: MAQBOOL SHERWANI WHO SAVED KASHMIR FROM RAIDERS

The lion of Kashmir Maqbool Sherwani was associated with the National Conference. He misguided the invaders when asked about the road leading to Srinagar. Pakistan’s plan was to capture Srinagar airport because it was the only option for deployment of Indian Army in case of immediate warfare. Controlling the Srinagar airport meant cutting off the Valley from the rest of India.

However, Maqbool Sherwani misguided the raiders and suggested them a wrong path that led them astray. However, after wandering on the wrong path for some time and realizing they had been misguided, the raiders returned to find Sherwani and punish him. They found him in Sumbal Bandipora, 35 kms from Baramulla, and pumped 14 bullets into his chest to set an example for Indian patriots.

SAVIOURS REACHED SRINAGAR AIRPORT ON OCTOBER 27

After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar under the command of Lt Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence perimeter and defeated the invaders on the outskirts of the city (Shalteng). There was a battle in Budgam too, close to the airport. By November 8, the Indian Army had taken control of Srinagar, on November 9, of Baramulla, and by November 13, of Uri.

However, with Pakistani forces formally entering the battlefield in support of the tribesmen, the war would continue for over a year, until a ceasefire was declared on the night of December 31, 1948, and the terms of the ceasefire were accepted on January 5, 1949.

The cycle of violence was started by Pakistan in Kashmir region by killing thousands of Kashmiris, including Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. Thousands of Hindu/Sikh women are still missing.

India observes October 22, every year, as ‘Black Day’ to protest against Pakistan and its role in instigating violence and terror in the Valley. On October 22, 1947, the Pakistani invaders looted and committed historic blunders in the state with a ferocity that shocked the people of J&K. The Indian Army came to their rescue and pushed the invaders back.

A terrorist is not just someone who wields the gun; a terrorist is also someone who endorses it. Killing terrorists is not a big deal but killing terrorism is.

The recent killings in Jammu and Kashmir are not surprising because it is not the first time terrorists are killing unarmed civilians and it won’t be the last. The game plan of terrorists is not to reverse and repeat 1990s but to shake and break Kashmir into parts. Terrorists are now targeting non-local civilians, including street vendors, carpenters and even dhaba-wallas, because they feel killing a Kashmiri Muslim will not have an impact. First, because of the state-turned-UT’s appeasement policy towards the majority Muslim population; second, because less noise is made by national media houses over such killings.

Killing of a local Kashmiri nationalist Muslim, however, should elicit the same response as the murder of non-local minority. Every drop of blood is precious.

The bloodbath in Jammu and Kashmir started in 1989 with the killings of both nationalist Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits, with the latter becoming the worst sufferers of Jihad—from abduction to killings, rape and exodus. The virus of Jihad didn’t stop here. It started consuming the Kashmiri Muslims too, who were once hand-in-glove with the Jihadis when Kashmiri Pandits were asked to leave the Valley few decades ago.

This virus was introduced by none other than Pakistan to grab Kashmir and use it for terror activities in order to avenge their loss in Bangladesh in 1971. A part of this land is already under the occupation of Pakistan and China and sadly no one is talking about it. No prizes for guessing where most of the Pakistani terror camps are located—in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Our land, which is under the occupation of Pakistan, is being used against us and we are still not speaking up!

OUR SILENCE IS THEIR LICENCE TO KILL

Selective condemnation is at its peak. There is a social sanctity to these killings, by labeling them as fabrications of Indian agencies. This silence-induced social sanctity and rampant vulture journalism stop us from calling a spade a spade—a terrorist a terrorist. Are we as a society suffering from a Bonnie and Clyde Syndrome? What makes us sympathise with gun-wielding drug addicts who rebel against law and order? Why do we offer excuses for their misdoings or provide them shelter in our homes? Or, offer them ideological acceptance on social media platforms and news channels?

We won’t speak up till the virus consumes one among us. The conflict beneficiaries and conflict tycoons are aware that Insaniyat and Kashmiriyat don’t exist anymore in the Valley, and they are now coming for us. Some of us still believe that the good things are always done by Pakistan and the bad things by India, to the point that we don’t even hesitate to safeguard those who murder our own people in the name of Jihad and we conveniently place the blame of every misdeed on the shoulders of India. How much more blood do we want to spill?

The killings of two golgappe walas have shocked me to the core. Before they were gunned down, these two poor street vendors must be thinking that had earned just Rs 100 that day, whether or not they would be able to provide food for their kids, or how much salt, turmeric powder should they add to their golgappas to make them more flavourful so that they can sell more the next day. The cries of their children must haunt us—and these will become a curse on our land.

After the recent killings of seven non-Muslim civilians in Kashmir, teams have been sent to combat insurgency and nab the terrorists who killed them. But a terrorist is not just someone who wields the gun; a terrorist is also someone who endorses it. Killing terrorists is not a big deal but killing terrorism is. This is not the same Jihad which we saw in 1990s; it has been renovated and modified with the passage of time. Now, the responsibility lies on the shoulders of those at the helm of affairs to combat terrorists as well as those who are in the business of terror.

One cannot blame the Indian government completely when people themselves shield terrorists and their supporters. Terrorism existed in Punjab and Assam as well but people in these states collectively rose against terror organizations and eliminated terrorism from the roots. It is about time Kashmiris learn to differentiate between the compassionate, spiritual Islam and the radical, intolerant Islam. They must choose sides wisely.

https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/kashmir-bloodbath-our-silence-is-their-licence-to-kill-4334216.html

As summer arrives in J&K the South Asian boiling point remains relatively calm.

By Sajid Yousuf Shah

The ceasefire announced by Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC) and international Border in Jammu and Kashmir on February 25 this year is nearing four months. Truce violations are their most subdued levels, providing the much-needed respite to the people residing in the border areas. In 2003 and 2018, India and Pakistan had signed ceasefire agreements but it was never implemented in letter and spirit, but this time around it appears that peace could acquire greater stability considering the reduced maneuverability of the extra-conventional tactics along the LoC.

Towards sustained stability:

Residents of border areas like Uri, Tangdhar, Kupwara and areas in Northern Kashmir during the past three months have heaved a sigh of relief. Natives of Churunda, Sarai Bandi and other villages close to the LoC in Uri sector have often remained in the line of fire of the aggression from Pakistan. These villages have witnessed unprovoked shelling since 1990. Ceasefire violations were mostly a ploy to provide cover to the infiltrators. In Sarai Bandi village six civilians were killed, many others sustained injuries and scores of residential houses were damaged on November 13, 2020 in the firing by Pakistani side [1].
Residents of this border hamlet and other villages have breathed a sigh of relief since February, hoping that guns fall silent forever. The LoC truce has rekindled hope of normalcy among the border populace.

Almost four months of truce has brought peace back in the lives of border dwellers. Their situation has been very sensitive as they used to get caught in the cross firing at any point of time. Residents are still skeptical about their future and want the government to expedite bunker construction. The summer has arrived in Kashmir and infiltration routes have opened up. According to the residents in Uri the government has constructed only one bunker, whereas the population is approximately 25,000 people. They are demanding setting up of individual or community bunkers.  The population of about a dozen villages near the LoC in Uri is around 20-25,000 and more bunkers are needed to protect the civilians from the onslaught from the other side. However, the official figures stated that the Indian government had sanctioned Rs 415 crore for the construction of over 14,400 underground bunkers along the LoC and the International Border. Over 8,600 bunkers were constructed in Jammu region, officials had stated.

Ceasefire violations Statistics :

According to the official data, year 2020 recorded highest ever 5100 ceasefire violations by Pakistan in J&K in past 17 years along the Line of Control (LoC) that claimed 36 lives and left more than 130 people injured [2]. In November 2020, on a single day, 10 civilians were killed in the Pakistani firing in north Kashmir’s Uri sector.

The year 2019 recorded over 3,200 instances of truce violations or an average of nine such violations daily. There were 3,289 truce violations by the Pakistan Army along the Indo-Pak border in 2019 of these, 1,565 violations took place after August 5, 2019—when the Indian government announced its decision to abrogate J&K’s special status and divided it into two union territories.
The data revealed in 2020, more than 5,000 incidents of ceasefire violation were recorded.  In November 2020, on a single day, 10 civilians were killed in firing in North Kashmir’s Uri sector.

In 2018, J&K recorded 2,936 instances of ceasefire violations by Pakistan with an average of eight cases daily, in which 61 people were killed and over 250 injured.
In 2017, 971 cases of truce violations were reported in which 31 people — 12 civilians and 19 security forces personnel — were killed and 151 others suffered injuries.
According to the official data, 405 cases of ceasefire violations were reported in 2015, and 583 in 2014.
There was a gradual increase in truce violations by Pakistan between 2009 and 2013. The corresponding figures for 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009 were 347, 114, 62, 44, and 28 respectively. The numbers of such violations were 77 in 2008, 21 in 2007 and three in 2006. For three years – 2004, 2005 and 2006 – there was not a single such violation on the border

In November 2020, Indian Army launched a counter offensive after ten civilians were killed in one day in Pakistan firing. A number of videos released by the Indian Army showed destruction of several Pakistani positions and bunkers across the LoC with some of them going up in flames following the Indian retaliation. According to intercepts of Pakistan Army’s communication, those killed included two commandos from its Special Service Group. In retaliation, a number of Pakistan Army bunkers, fuel dumps and militant launch pads across the LoC were targeted [4].

Changed equations:

Equations between India and Pakistan changed after senior officials from both sides entered into talks last year, where international community, particularly the channels from the US and the UAE, is believed to have partly played a constructive role in facilitating these talks. Following the clandestine talks, the DGMOs from both the countries announced a truce in February.

Several offensive units posted along the LoC were asked to pull back but the regular soldiers meant for anti-infiltration grids remained stationed at their stated positions. The peace agreement along the LoC has proved mutually beneficial for both the countries 

The past peace initiatives, for instance the May 2018 ceasefire did not last long compared to the present one. Top Indian army officials have made it explicitly clear that the Army remains committed to fighting militancy and any such activities would be deal with as per the procedure. It is yet to be confirmed whether launch pads have permanently closed on the Pakistani side of the LoC. As the melting of snow makes this part of the year vulnerable to infiltrations, the coming two months are crucial if stability (if not perpetual peace) is to become a permanent feature and the Pakistani side needs to come clear on preventing infiltrations.

Within Kashmir itself, the constitutional change did not generate instabilities as the Pakistani side had projected to the international community, with some sections of the strategists accusing the Kashmiris of complacency, and not commensurate with diplomatic and covert efforts Pakistan had put for the past three decades. Within Pakistan itself, there are reports of the Army attempting to influence the political parties and the media to work towards promoting conducive atmosphere for the revival of the bilateral relationship. This should not be read as a unidirectional or a benevolent gesture since this could be the military’s way of testing the public perceptions and yet remaining behind the scenes. This fact (the military’s nudge to the media) was revealed in Hamid Mir’s recent statements which became very controversial. Besides this, an analysis of Gen Bajwa’s statements over these years have testified to his willingness to ease the tensions, but the societal obsession and ideological aspects of the Pakistani nationalism prevent the political and religious parties from any marginally flexible approach, even if the top leadership of the Army may wish it.

The Pakistani side needs to realise that cross border shelling, infiltrations and support to separatists have not helped its cause in J&K. Beyond exploiting some nuisance value, not much has been achieved on ground or in the international sphere. The practical way forward is to engage in talks and chart a mutual course of action for the issues that remain entangled beneath the nationalist egos. Any headway is only possible when sub-conventional warfare comes to an end, giving the much-needed confidence for the talks to take place in a conducive atmosphere.

Reference:

5. https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/jk-border-residents-heave-sigh-of-relief-week-after-indiapakistan-agreement-on-ceasefire/2040624
6. https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/12/29/5-100-ceasefire-violations-by-pak-forces-this-year–highest-in-1.html
7. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/2019-recorded-highest-ever-ceasefire-violations-by-pakistan-in-jammu-and-kashmir-in-last-16-years/articleshow/73100346.cms?from=mdr
8. https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-the-loc-is-heating-up-1741160-2020-11-15
9. https://theprint.in/defence/india-pakistan-agree-to-observe-ceasefire-along-loc-pull-back-specialised-offensive-units/611567/

20 years ago, my mother died before my eyes. Militants killed her, destroying my childhood, writes Sajid Yousuf Shah. 

20 years ago, during a visit to my native village, Sogam Lolab, as an excited 8-year-old, my life changed forever.

We were visiting after a long time. From Srinagar, we had traveled to north Kashmir’s Kupwara to reach the village.

Upon arrival, my mother decided to visit my uncle’s house and spend the night. She insisted that I stay with her but I didn’t listen. I went to another uncle’s place to have fun, as I hadn’t met them in a long time. Little did I know, it was going to be the last time I would speak to my mother.

To my surprise, at around 6 PM that day, all the neighbouring houses in the village switched off their lights. I asked my cousin about it, and he said, “Militants make routine visits to the houses in the village, and people offer them food and other things. Nobody has the guts to say anything to them. Whatever they say, everyone follows.”

Seeing My Mother For The Last Time

At around 7 PM, while I was playing carrom with my cousins, we heard some gunshots. Initially we thought it to be an encounter between security forces and militants, because militancy was far too common in the Valley back then. After a few minutes, upon hearing loud cries from outside, we rushed to the gate to find my aunt weeping. When we entered the house where my mother was staying for the night, we saw blood stains on the walls. My elder sister fainted, and my brother and I had no idea what was going on.

The following day, people started gathering at our house. I saw two lifeless bodies lying on the bed — that of my mother’s and that of my uncle’s.

There was a cotton roll full of blood in my mother’s right eye.

Eight-year-old me kept asking everyone why was she lying on the bed and why nobody was speaking to her or asking her to talk. I could only think of her being angry at me for not staying with her the previous night. Then I saw my father crying and realised something was wrong. Nobody responded to my questions; everybody was crying.

In the evening, I was told to see my mother’s face for the last time before the burial. I also went to the graveyard and filled her grave with my hands. It was all a blur, and I was absolutely clueless about the goings-on.

What Happened To My Mother & Uncle?

So what really happened that fateful night to my mother? The story goes, the militants had come knocking on my uncle’s door, and asked my mother for water. When she returned with water, one of them shot my uncle in the chest, while another shot my mother in the eye. Both of them died on the spot, and the militants fled.

Those militants not only killed two people – they rendered seven children motherless in the blink of an eye.

Twenty years have passed, but the incident remains fresh in my memory. I still recall my last moments with my mother.

The Law Of The Jungle

As per the central government’s data, there has been a 40 percent decline in the recruitment of militants in 2019 since the previous year. After the crackdown on Jamaat-e-Islami and the Hurriyat, stone-pelting has reduced. The Hurriyat has also faced opposition and rejection rejected from different sections of the Valley because of their failed Kashmir policy.

But the youth in south Kashmir, especially Tral, Pulwama, Shopian, continue to join militant outfits. They tend to easily fall for the ideals of jihad, after systematic brainwashing. They have no idea what they are up to, but they seem to prefer death over life.

Militant outfits succeed in this indoctrination mainly by using social media for their propaganda.

It’s believed that (late) Hizbul commander Burhan Wani heralded the use of social media to recruit Kashmiri youth into militant ranks.

The fear of the gun in Kashmir is the only reason people don’t want to raise their voice against militancy and violence. In the past, we have witnessed the fate of those who have spoken against gun culture and violence in the Valley. Nobody dares to question the militants in such an atmosphere.

(The writer is a social activist from Srinagar. He can be reached at @TheSkandar. This is a personal blog, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)

https://www.thequint.com/voices/blogs/militancy-kashmir-valley-children-personal-account-losing-family-members#read-more

One year after Pakistan’s most prized “Good Taliban” asset, the former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, ‘escaped’ from the military’s custody, the Pakistan Army spokesman declared before correspondents of foreign media that all efforts are being made to re-arrest him but the security forces weren’t aware of his whereabouts. Actually Pakistan Army made similar statements about Osama Bin Laden and we all know how that played out – the most wanted terrorist in the world was living a stone’s throw away from the Pakistan Military Academy and yet no one knew anything about his whereabouts. Therefore, no one would easily buy into the claims of the ISPR chief regarding Ehsanullah Ehsan. The reason is simple: the Pakistan Army has still not given up making a distinction between “good Taliban”(those who follow instructions and orders of the military) and “bad Taliban” (those who are recalcitrant and try to forge an autonomous, even independent path). In other words, Pakistan doesn’t have a problem with Taliban; it only has a problem with Taliban who don’t take their lead from the Pakistan Army.

The same policy extends also to the Afghan Taliban. In the February press conference, the DG ISPR indulged in typical Pakistani obfuscation aimed at assuring, but actually misleading Western policy makers. According to Maj. Gen. Babar Iftikhar, “It is impossible for the Taliban to recapture Kabul and that Pakistan would support them. It isn’t going to happen.” This is clear deception. Even in the 1990s the Pakistanis played this game. Back then they fully backed the Taliban offensive, even deputing officers and Non-Commissioned Officers to guide Taliban military operations. But for international consumption, the Pakistanis made a show of indulging in frenetic diplomatic activity aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the civil war. The same playbook is being used today. The Pakistanis know that their proxies – Afghan Taliban – are not only likely to capture Kabul, but will do so with ‘unstinting’ Pakistani support. In fact, Pakistan would like nothing better than to see the Taliban Emirate restored in Kabul. That is precisely what Pakistan has worked towards over the last 20 years, since 9/11. Having invested so much in the Taliban, there is no way that the Pakistanis are going to change their strategy when they are so close to achieving the objective for which they have dared even the sole superpower for two decades now.

But it is not only the Afghan Taliban which Pakistan sees as the “good Taliban”. Even among the Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistani Establishment distinguishes between the “Good and Bad Taliban” on the basis of who does Pakistan’s bidding. During the worst days of TTP violence between 2007-15, even when the Taliban were attacking civilians and security forces daily, there was a calibrated approach that the Pakistan Army followed in curbing the activities of the Islamist jihadists. The Pakistan Army went out of its way to sign peace deals, sometimes agreeing to humiliating conditions, to appease the Pakistani Taliban. There was a conviction among the top military leadership that the Taliban were their strategic assets; the only play that Pakistan had in the Great Game that was taking place in the Af-Pak region. As a result, these jihadists had to be nurtured, protected, and when they stepped out of line, nudged back into line. This reining in was done through the many ‘operations’ – almost all of them piecemeal – that were carried out in one part or the other of the Pashtun tribal belt straddling the border with Afghanistan.

It was only when things really spiralled out of control, that the Pakistanis were forced to move against the Taliban, at which time they became the “bad Taliban”. For instance, in Swat, the Taliban depredations had continued right under the nose of the Pakistan Army. The killings, kidnappings, extortion, Islamic diktats, the FM radio stations delivering blood curdling sermons were all happening taking place in the face of the Pak Army. There were innumerable instances where army and Taliban checkposts were separated by just a few meters. But it was only after an international hue and cry – Taliban are just 60 miles away from Islamabad – that the Army was forced to launch a major operation. But every operation was carried out selectively. The Army pretended the operation was indiscriminate, but on the sly it would give free and safe passage to Taliban elements who stayed on the right side of the military. For instance, when the Operation Rah-e-Nijat was launched in South Waziristan, the Taliban under Mullah Nazir were left unmolested. When the much vaunted Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in North Waziristan, both Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the Haqqani Network were given adequate warning. In fact, the Haqqani Network was facilitated in its move to safe areas and settle there just before the operation. Even after the operation, the Pakistan Army allowed every “Bad Taliban” a chance to turn into “Good Taliban”. Many of them were given amnesty and allowed to go back into business. For instance the head of the Punjabi Taliban – Asmatullah Muaviya – was quietly won over and his energies redirected to reigniting the Jihad in Kashmir. From bad Jihad (against Pakistan) to good Jihad (against India) the “Bad Taliban” were overnight transformed into “Good Taliban”.

One of the primary reasons why Pakistan will never let go of the specious distinction it makes between the “good and bad Taliban” is because Pakistan being an Islamic State believes that Islamism is the best antidote and counter to ethnic nationalism. The Taliban being Islamists are therefore seen as an asset against the ethnic nationalists in places like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Sindh. Thus, the Lashkar-e-Taiba is promoted in Sindh to counter Sindhi nationalism; the TTP in tribal districts (former FATA) to counter the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM); and the Sunni death squads of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi led by people like Shafiq Mengal to counter Baloch freedom fighters. The PTM in particular has been agitating against terrorism and has accused the Pakistan Army of bringing back the Taliban in the erstwhile FATA region to intimidate the PTM supporters.

The recent spate of violence – target killings in particular, including those of PTM cadres – is being blamed on the “good or reformed Taliban”. Even the border fence that it being constructed along with Durand Line is a bit of an eyewash because it isn’t so much to prevent Taliban from crossing over as it is to incentivise the “good Taliban”and facilitate their exfiltration while preventing the “bad or recalcitrant Taliban” from infiltrating. The incentivisation is also being done through smuggling joint ventures run by Pakistan’s Frontier Corps which helps to raise the resources for both Afghan as well as Pakistani Taliban. Among other contraband, the smuggling includes narcotics. It also involves facilitating third-parties that are then ‘taxed’ by the Taliban, a part of the proceeds being shared with FC officials.

Pakistan has had to pay a heavy price in the past because of its “good Taliban – bad Taliban” policy because it doesn’t take much for the “good”Taliban to become “bad”. In the 1990s for instance, the Pakistanis backed the Afghan Taliban to the hilt, but the moment they came to power, they refused to endorse the Durand Line. Nor did Mullah Omar’s Taliban curb the activities of Sunni terrorists of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi who were wanted by Pakistan. On a host of other issues, the Taliban showed themselves to be autonomous of Pakistan. The situation was similar with the Pakistani Taliban. Of course, Pakistan believes it has learnt its lessons and next time will ensure that the “good Taliban” stay good. One way in which this is sought to be achieved is by ensuring that pro-Pakistan elements like the Haqqani Network occupy a pivotal position in the Taliban ranks and decision making matrix. The Pakistanis have also resorted to target killing of some Taliban commanders in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to send home the message that anyone who crosses the Pakistani Establishment will pay a heavy price. In addition, Pakistan has maintained its stranglehold over the Taliban leadership by keeping their families hostage inside Pakistan. How long Pakistan can continue to play this game is not clear. Perhaps once the Taliban come into their own, they will certainly try to get into a position where they can cut the strings that make them vulnerable to Pakistan.

If Pakistan is really sincere about restoring peace in Afghanistan and ushering in an era of development in the region then it has to rubbish all notion of making a distinction between “good and bad” Taliban. This distinction is as meaningless as that other great fiction that Pakistan tried to sell during the Bonn Process after 9/11 – “moderate Taliban”. Apart from being an oxymoron, “moderate Taliban” is a beast that is even more elusive than the Yeti. Pakistan has continued its efforts to make a case for the Taliban; clearly indicating that Islamabad is not ready to either give up on the Taliban or reform its policy towards the region. Apparently, for Pakistan it is a lesson still not learnt.